A thesis familiar by being as often disputed as defended has it that intentional action is action for a reason. The present paper contributes to the defence of a weaker version of it, namely: Acting with an intention or a purpose is acting (as things appear to one) for a reason.
Explanatory reasons
Whatever provides the answer to questions about the reason why things are as they are, become what they become, or to any other reason-why question is a Reason.
Reason-why questions seek explanations and whatever provides or constitutes the explanations is the reason why whatever it explains is as it is. Needless to say I am not proposing a grammatical test. Reason-why questions can be asked without using those words. We can ask 'what is the reason for the deformation?', or 'what explains the deformation?', or use other words. What is important is the distinction between providing (or purporting to provide) information ('It is four p.m.', 'She is in Sydney') and providing (or purporting to provide) explanations. Reasons provide explanations.
Some writers take propositions to provide explanations, and therefore to be reasons. As false propositions explain nothing I will join those who take facts to be explanatory reasons. One reason to take propositions (rather than facts) to be explanatory reasons is that logical and conceptual relations hold among propositions regardless of their truth. But it is well worth preserving the core idea (that reasons explain) even at the cost of occasional complexity or awkwardness of expression.
Facts are reasons why; that is, they are not reasons in themselves, but reasons why something is thus and so, reasons in their function of providing an explanation.
Possibly, any fact is a reason for something or other. For every fact there may be a reason-why question, in a correct reply to which it figures. To refer to a fact as an explanatory reason is to refer, at least implicitly, to a relation it has to something else: it is a reason why this or that happened, etc.
Arguably, explanations are also relative to the person(s) for whom they are
intended. An explanation is a good one if it explains what it sets out to explain in a way which is accessible to its addressees, that is in a way that the addressees could what it explains to convey any useful information (e.g., 'this fact explains something about the origin of life'). On the other hand, while the criteria for an explanation being a good one are relative to its addressees, what is an explanation is not. An explanation of the nature of laser radiation suitable for university students is an explanation of laser radiation, even though it is not a good explanation for primary school children.
Explanatory reasons are so in virtue of their relations to what they explain, and stating that a fact is a reason is stating that it stands in the explanatory relation to what it is a reason for.
As you see I am using 'reason' to refer to any fact which figures (nonredundantly) in an explanation, and not merely to the totality of facts all of which figure (non-redundantly) in an explanation. It is tempting to call the totality of all the facts which figure non-redundantly in an explanation a complete reason. I may occasionally use the term in order to avoid complex formulations. But if taken literally it implies more than is warranted: it implies that there is at least one comprehensive way of individuating facts, such that relative to any such scheme of individuation and object of explanation, it is either true or not, regarding each fact, that it belongs to the explanation of that object. There is reason to doubt that the explanation relation is such that it is ever true that regarding any object of explanation there is a set of explanatory facts such that it explains that object, and that adding any other fact to it is redundant so far as that explanation goes. It seems that our ways of individuating facts and the notion of explanation are such that any explanation can always be nonredundantly amplified, clarified and expanded.
We should therefore take talk of complete explanation with a pinch of salt. The important point is that normally in advancing or citing reasons, non-trivial parts of 'complete' reasons are cited as (asserted to be) reasons, and by so citing them the speaker implicitly refers to 'a complete reason' (or to a disjunction of complete Nor is it necessarily the case that the reasons to believe a proposition are the facts which explain that belief (that believing) if the belief is rational or rationally held.
The reason which explains the believing looks back to its causes (the causes of having it or of still having it). The rationality of believing depends on one's openness to critical evaluation of the belief, one's ability and willingness to revise or reject it were the evidence to point that way.
One may say that reasons for a belief are those facts which explain the believing, the acquisition of the belief, when it was rationally induced. But this view allows that 'reasons' is ambiguous between explanatory reasons, which, presumably, can explain all beliefs, and normative reasons, e.g. reasons for belief, which also explain those beliefs which were rationally arrived at or are rationally sustained, that is beliefs arrived at or sustained because of reasons for the beliefs. Regarding the latter kind of reasons their ability to explain the believing depends on the fact that they are normative reasons, reasons which can justify a belief, whether or not they also explain it, and which explain beliefs as rational or justified because they are normative reasons.
Can one avoid this conclusion by claiming that reasons for belief explain why one ought to believe? When one ought to believe something, reasons for believing it, reasons which justify believing it, will be among the considerations which explain why one ought to have that belief. That is because one ought only to have beliefs which one is warranted, justified, in having. But that explanatory role depends on and presupposes the distinctive normative role of normative reasons.
Moreover, reasons for belief do more than justify belief which one ought to have. Not infrequently the evidence for a proposition is such that while believing it is warranted, failure to believe it is not irrational. In such cases it is false that one ought 
Normative reasons and ought-propositions -Broome's reasons:
I take reasons to be the key to an understanding of normativity. Possibly one or several other concepts can play a similar role, though I suspect that they will not be among the concepts normally used by English speakers today. This section explores the suggestion, as defended by Broome, that the basic normative concept is that of ought-facts, and that reasons are to be explained by their role in explaining ought-facts.
I will continue to use the more common terminology of true ought-propositions, meaning true propositions which can be expressed in sentences containing an ought operator (used in their primary meaning). My discussion of Broome's views has two objects: first, to understand why ought is not the basic concept; second, to explain why Broome's understanding of reasons is partial and misleading.
Broome's view revolves around three theses:
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To explain qua reasons for belief. They may explain any number of things which have nothing to do with their force as reasons for belief. They may, e.g., explain why it is raining.
A) Some reasons are perfect reasons: 'A perfect reason for you to Φ is … a fact that explains why you ought to Φ'.
B)
Other reasons are pro tanto reasons: 'A pro tanto reason for you to Φ is a fact that plays the for-Φ role in a potential or actual weighing explanation of why you ought to Φ, or in a potential or actual weighing explanation of why it is not the case that you ought to Φ and not the case that you ought not to Φ'. (41) C) Some true ought-propositions cannot be explained by normative reasons.
The first thing to note about the theses is that they are consistent with the view that 'reason' is ambiguous between the explanatory and the normative sense.
Arguably only facts which constitute normative reasons can explain true oughtpropositions. Broome repeatedly asserts (34-5) that perfect reasons are not normative; they merely explain a normative fact. But there is no reason to think that normative reasons cannot explain other normative facts, and, as I point out below, it is difficult to understand his pro tanto reasons except as normative facts, a species of normative reasons, which, among other things, play a part in explanatory reasons of the kind he calls 'perfect reasons', namely in the explanation of the truth of some ought propositions.
So "perfect reasons" can be normative. Broome is right, however, to point out that all perfect reasons, i.e. all explanations of why one ought to do this or that or to believe this or that, will include elements which are not normative reasons. They all require a closure proposition, that is a proposition which states that the explanation includes all the factors relevant to the truth of the ought-proposition, and closure We can now return to the third of Broome's three contested claims, that is that normative reasons merely contribute to the explanation of ought-propositions. I suggested already in the previous section that that is not all that they do. The second example is drawn from a case recognised by Broome. He mentions that sometimes it is not the case that one ought to Φ, nor is it the case that one ought not to Φ. As he says such cases may belong to different subcategories (38-9). In some there are no normative reasons either for or against Φ-ing. In others there are reasons pro and con Φ-ing which do not defeat one another. Now here the existence of normative reasons is essential to elucidate the difference between these two types of that we have a right to do something; that certain options are acceptable (we may have a right to do unacceptable things); that it would be prudent to take some actions; that we should take some actions; that it would be irrational not to take them; and others.
One such conclusion, different from any of the ones I mentioned, is that we ought to take some action. Ought-propositions are not the centre of practical thought. Nor are they the foundations on the basis of which we can understand reasons. Rather, they are one of a variety of propositions whose truth conditions are the existence or absence of some normative reasons or others.
There is one particular factor which complicates the explanations of oughtpropositions. Let us focus on propositions of the form: 'When C, P ought to Φ'
(where 'C' stands for circumstances, 'P' for a person, or a set of people, and 'Φ' for an action, a doing or an omission It is one of the virtues of the concept of normative reasons that it enables us to think about normatively complex and indefinitely changeable situations, helping us to marshal their normatively significant features into forms which facilitate coherent deliberation. So how are universal ought-propositions related to specific ones and to reasons? I think that propositions of the form 'When C, P ought to Φ' are true just in case, and because, there is a reason (or a number of reasons) which applies whenever C is the case, and which in at least some instances of C is a conclusive reason for P to Φ.
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On this view it is a conceptual truth that there are normative reasons which explain why one ought to Φ, when one ought to. This account of the truth conditions of practical ought-propositions 10 specifies the same truth conditions for specific and for universal ought-propositions. It is merely that as specific propositions apply only to one occasion they are true only if on that occasion there is a conclusive reason to do as they indicate.
This account cannot be taken to be a general account of the meaning of oughtpropositions. For one thing it does not generalise to epistemic oughts, to what we ought to believe. 11 It has other limitations as well. It is too simple to capture the nuanced ways in which 'ought' is standardly used, and therefore also to account for the nuanced differences among propositions in whose expression it features. It does explain, however, why practical ought-propositions cannot play any foundational role in understanding practical thought.
Note that I am referring to simple unqualified ought-propositions (displaying the general form 'X ought to Φ' or 'when C X ought to Φ). Their meaning varies when qualified: one always ought to Φ may mean that one's reason for Φ-ing is always conclusive, etc.
10
First suggested by me in [1978] .
11
I suspect that 'P ought to believe that ....' indicates that it would be irrational (or more weakly, a failure of rationality) for P not to believe that ... . one may well reject a true proposition that one ought to Φ, or just fail to Φ, without committing any rational fault.
The Normative/Explanatory Nexus
It seems plausible to assume that reasons in both senses are called 'reasons'
because of their connection to Reason. But there is a closer connection between them which explains the common name. Briefly said it is that normative reasons provide the standard explanations of beliefs and of actions done with an intention or a purpose.
Moreover, it is a necessary condition of any fact being a reason that, when conditions are appropriate, it provides such an explanation. Put another way, epistemic reasons can explain (or figure in an explanation of) beliefs, and practical reasons can explain (or figure in an explanation of) actions performed with an intention or purpose.
This point is generally recognised, though sometimes neglected. It expresses the thought that normative reasons can guide agents, that is that they can move agents, who are aware of them, to action, belief and the like. Hence they can feature in explanations of such actions, beliefs and the like. In further exploring that idea I will not be looking for a characterisation of the causal or other mechanisms on the existence of which these explanations depend. I will merely try to characterise the kind of explanation involved. We can start the exploration in the company of Bernard Williams, since the point was crucial to his argument for reason internalism. If there are reasons for action, it must be that people sometimes act for those reasons, and if they do their reasons must figure in some correct explanation of their action.
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Furthermore, the role reasons play in the explanation must be of a certain form. If that R is a reason to Φ, then it must be possible that awareness that R motivated the agent to Φ.
Sometimes the phrase 'motivating reasons' is invoked in such contexts. I will not use it myself, for it is liable to confuse. Sometimes the phrase is used to refer to a kind of explanatory reasons for actions, those which explain them by explaining that they were motivated by belief in the existence of a (normative) reason. That sense is much narrower than the natural understanding of the phrase (motivating reasons being reasons explaining actions by their motivations) on the one hand, and is wider than the way the phrase is sometimes used (to refer to reasons explaining actions by reference to being motivated by awareness of reasons for them) on the other hand.
14 [] Back to business: what matters for our purpose is not that facts that are normative reasons can explain (that they can figure in the explanation of) actions. Just about any fact can (given appropriate circumstances) figure in some explanation of some actions. The normative/explanatory nexus requires that the potential explanatory role of facts which are normative reasons depends on and presupposes their normative force: it has to be that they can explain because they are normative reasons. That I promised can explain my promise-keeping action of giving a copy of my 
More generally he asks:
'Does believing that a particular consideration is a reason to act in a particular way provide, or indeed constitute, a motivation to act? … Let us grant that it doesthis claim indeed seems plausible …' (ibid.).
The crux for Williams is not directly in the possibility of being motivated by one's beliefs but in the way one could acquire such motivating beliefs: This leads in several steps to the requirement that the reason itself figure in the explanation. First, the belief must be belief in the fact which is a reason, and include realisation of its character as a reason. Motivations to perform a particular act would not be reliably and rationally brought about (or constituted) by a belief unless the belief was a belief about a reason to perform that act. Second, the belief itself must be explained by the existence of the reason, and it must be acquired or maintained in a rational way. Therefore, third, the reason itself figures in the explanation of the action, in being part of the explanation of the belief which motivated the action. And finally, fourth, the belief, the awareness of the reason (where it is rational and true) must not only prompt, but guide the action.
A typical objection relies on the fact that, as was pointed out at the beginning of the article, an act is intentional, and done with a purpose even if the belief which motivated it is false. It follows, goes the objection, that the fact which renders the belief true (when it is true) cannot be part of the explanation of the action. It has, of course, to be admitted that when the belief is false (a) the action can be explained, and (b) its explanation as intentional must include reference to the belief that there was a reason for it (as was argued in the first point above), and (c) as there is no reason to make that belief true, no reason can be part of the explanation. But that applies to the explanation of intentional actions based on false beliefs. In such cases the explanation does not refer to a normative reason for the action. Even if there were such reasons they do not explain why the action was performed. However, the objection continues, if the belief alone is sufficient to explain intentional actions when it is false it must also be sufficient to explain actions when the belief is true. The further factor, the existence of the reason is not necessary to the explanation which is, as is shown by the case of false beliefs, adequate without it.
It has to be admitted that citing the belief, without adding that it is rational and true does explain the action, and shows it to be intentional. we rationally react to it. 16 After all explanations which end with the belief, and do not refer to its rationality or to the reason itself, cannot explain whether the intentionality was successful or a failure. An intentional action which cannot be explained by the reason which motivated it is one which fails in its own terms. When acting for a purpose we aim to do something for an adequate reason. When the reason we intended to follow was not there to follow, the action turns out to be something other 16 Though even if we believe something because things are as we believe (say I believe that there is a tree in my garden because there is one) what explains the belief need not explain an irrational reaction to it (e.g. if I react to my belief by irrational panic that the tree will fall on me and will kill me on my birthday). That belongs to the fourth and last stage in the account. than it set out to be. It was, to that extent, a failed intentional action. In explaining intentional actions we need to make clear what they were meant to be and whether they succeeded, and that means that where available, the reason is part of the explanation of the action as a successful intentional action.
Finally, to the fourth claim, that awareness of the reason must guide the action.
I do not mean that otherwise the motivation would be irrational. There are many possible causal routes from a belief in a reason to motivation, which while not irrational, are adventitious. If normative reasons are to meet a meaningful explanatory potential requirement they must be capable of explaining through belief in their existence qua reasons. The element of guidance can be understood by analogy to a negative feedback mechanism: we, automatically and normally without being conscious of the fact, monitor the performance of the intentional action such that if it deviates from the course we implicitly take to lead to its successful completion we correct the performance, bringing it back to the correct path, or interrupt it, when we fail to correct it. So, the claim is that one's action is guided by a reason just in case that one is motivated by the reason, through awareness of it, in a way which is manifested by the (normally unconscious) self-correcting process of tracking the success of the process of performing the action.
Another possible worry may be generated by my claim that reasons explain actions through the mediation of awareness of the reasons as reasons. It may be thought that this implies possessing concepts and having beliefs which many people who act for reasons do not have. This worry, if justified, may not disprove the letter of the normative/explanatory nexus. After all it requires nothing more than the possibility of certain explanations. But it would go against its spirit. For surely, the nexus is meant to relate to a standard form of explanation which can be used to explain any action for a reason. The worry is, however, unjustified.
Having concepts and conceptual thought involves recognising the implications of the concepts we use, and being guided by them, reacting to them appropriately and trying to adjust our responses when becoming aware that they are inappropriate. The inferential connections between concepts and between thoughts can be spelt out in general terms. We may say that there are principles which spell out these connections.
Knowledge of such principles, however, requires having concepts which not all those who have the thoughts that they explain need have. For example it may require having the concept of a reason, which not everyone capable of conceptual thought has. This means that the gap between having concepts and knowing how to employ them, on the one hand, and being able to think about the principles which govern one's understanding of those concepts, on the other, is greater than may appear. I can treat a promise as a reason, and as we may say, implicitly know that it is a reason, without being able to understand any statement of the principle which sets out what I understand when I understand the notion of a promise. We are here in territory which was explored by Brandom, and using his terminology we may say that making things explicit is more difficult than is sometimes thought, for it may require concepts one need not have to have the implicit knowledge.
I therefore conclude that it is justified to say that the normative/explanatory nexus does not require excessive conceptual mastery, nor excessive conceptual knowledge. As was already explained, the requirement that normative reasons explain through agents being aware of reasons as reasons is necessary to ensure that we refer to the right kind of explanation, and the right kind of explanation is explanation mediated by our rational faculties.
A final possible dissatisfaction I will mention here is that none of the above constitutes an explanation of the productive process which leads to awareness of the reason and from there to the motivation and the action. That is, of course, true, but I doubt that it is a drawback. Welcome as such explanations are, they are not needed for an understanding of the normative/explanatory nexus. Indeed so far as that goes they may do too much. As stated the nexus is sufficient, for those who understand it, to distinguish cases in which an action is done for a normative reason (and can be explained relying on the nexus) from other cases. It can be rightly pointed out that the ability to distinguish those cases made possible by the statement of the nexus is not sharp, that it leaves us undecided in many cases in ways which no further explanation can resolve. But that is just how things should be. 
